discontents that, despite their respective merits, do not allow such an endeavour, either because of an exclusive focus on the political-institutional domain, or because of a reliance on survey questions.
The first of these focuses on the role that political discontents play for the rising salience of populist parties (e.g., Canovan, 1999 Canovan, , 2005 Taggart, 2000; Mudde, 2004 Mudde, , 2010 Mény and Surel, 2002) . Populism, a dominant definition holds, is 'an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite", and which argues that politics should be an expression of the [general will] of the people' (Mudde, 2004: 543) . This is exactly what populist parties all over Europe emphasise, and it does therefore not surprise that discontents about established parties and politicians among the public underlie their support. Studies on the salience of political discontents for populism, however, mostly analyse electoral results, party programs and statements by populist leaders (Pauwels, 2011) , and are exclusively focused on their formulation in the political-institutional sphere (see however: Uitermark et al., 2012; Rooduijn, 2013 for some exceptions). Scholars studying populism acknowledge that political discontents can exist in times of low political articulation, but their interest predominantly lies in their expression in the political-institutional sphere. Taggart (2000: 5) , for instance, has taken this position, stating that although '[c] ulturally, populism runs through societies as the celebration of the virtue of ordinary people (..)', he is mainly interested in 'populism once it is a political phenomenon, when it is mobilized'. Such a focus on the political-institutional sphere did yield many valuable insights into the relevance of political discontents for the populist ideology and their articulation by populist leaders, but is, by definition, less informative on how political discontents are formulated and expressed by ordinary citizens.
The second line of research on political discontents focuses on the declining levels of public trust in government, politicians and institutions (e.g., Dalton, 2005; Norris, 1999; Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 1995; Stoker, 2006; Hay, 2007; Van Wessel, 2010; Korsten and de Goede, 2006; Kaina, 2008; see however: Bovens and Wille, 2011; Van de Walle et al., 2008) . In reports of those declines, scholars generally express concerns about the level of public support for either specific (democratic) institutions or for democratic principles at large, and, based on that, often formulate concrete remedies to solve this 'political disenchantment' (Stoker, 2006) . In many cases, these boil down to expanding citizen participation, the provision of more information, transparency, and institutional reform (Norris, 2011: 238) .
Contrary to studies of populism, those focusing on trust in the government, politicians and institutions do address political discontents that are not articulated in the politicalinstitutional sphere. Yet, these studies strongly rely on survey data. As a result, political discontents are measured by means of closed questions that have been formulated by statistical bureaus and the researchers themselves. This can be considered problematic since 'in empirical research in particular, citizens' views are studied through the analysis of factors in causal relations; rarely are citizens approached as actors having their own understandings of politics. This suggests that important explanations of political disaffection may be ignored ' (Van Wessel, 2010: 505) .
In addition, such survey questions on political discontents measure the level or degree of distrust vis-à-vis politicians, politics and the government (e.g., Halman, 2006; Dekker et al., 2006; Norris, 2011) . This means that political discontent is measured by questions on whether one 'tend[s] to trust or tend [s] not to trust' different institutions (Eurobarometer series), 'how much confidence' one has in certain institutions, or by asking one's opinion on 'how democratic the country is governed today' on a scale from 1 to 10 (World Values Survey, in Norris, 2011) .
Such survey data can be of great value for assessing trends in political distrust but can, however, not provide insight in the different complaints citizens formulate themselves or the specific reasons they give for their discontents. Such insight, we hold, provides the opportunity to better understand contemporary distrust in the government, politicians and institutions, as well as the cultural breeding ground for populism (cf. Kaina, 2008; Van Wessel 2010) .
In what follows we will, therefore, study contemporary political discontents as these are formulated by the people themselves. To do so, we conduct an inductive study that enables us to answer the research question: what are contemporary political discontents actually about?
Case, method and data
In this case study we will focus on popular discontents in the (Bovens & Wille, 2008; Hendriks, 2009) , has only tentatively been explained by the prevailing 'objective' factors and the study of political distrust has therefore been said to require a focus on 'citizens' perceptions of the political system' (Van der Meer, 2010: 532) .
In addition, for the Netherlands, as for many West European countries, this decade has been characterised by political turmoil, especially since the rise of the late Pim Fortuyn in 2001, who put the issues of immigration and integration on the political agenda with a firm antiestablishment rhetoric (Houtman et al., 2012) , and the subsequent growing popularity of rightwing populist parties such as Geert Wilders' PVV.
1 Both Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders claimed that they voice the political discontents of ordinary people, suggesting that these had been neglected by established politicians and political parties. This most visible current manifestation of political discontents in the Netherlands therefore seems to have a specific newrightist character and has been conceptualised as 'the silent counter-revolution' (Ignazi, 1992) or 'counterculture 2.0' (Houtman, 2011) , with reference to the new-leftist anti-establishment ethic of the 1960s that has become known as the 'silent revolution' (Inglehart, 1977) or the 'counterculture' (Roszak, 1969) .
To study the political discontents voiced by the people themselves we chose to analyse the letters sent to the editor of a newspaper. This choice is informed by the assumption that the letters to the editor section has 'historically (…) been seen by both journalism scholars and practitioners as a central public forum; a place where democracy blossoms because regular citizens are allowed a voice of their own. (..) [T] he normative vision informing the section is one of a public sphere institution that thrives through vigorous discussion and participation.' (WahlJorgenson, 2004: 90) .
Although ordinary citizens may also express themselves online, on forums or in comment sections, these platforms, Wahl-Jorgenson argues,'tend towards more specialized topics, the letters section is only restricted insofar as it takes the form of a response to items already placed on the news agenda by the paper (..). As such, it may deal with any topic of common concern or in the "public interest" '(2004 : 92) . 2 For the purpose of the present study, the letters to the editor section is thus seen as a platform that allows ordinary citizens to share their political discontents. copied by taking photos of the microfilm reader screen. Considering the vast number of letters to the editor published in the decade under study we needed to make a selection before our analysis.
We took a representative random sample from the letters to the editor sections by means of the constructed week sampling method (Riffe et al., 1993; cf. Janssen et al., 2008) . We followed Riffe et al. (1993) , who concluded that two constructed weeks provide a representative sample of a year's newspaper editions and constructed two weeks of letters sections of De Telegraaf from a randomly selected Monday issue, a Tuesday issue, a Wednesday issue, etc., for each year under study. Such a random week has the advantage of controlling for day and periodical effects, i.e., it have rapidly reduced this digital divide. With regards to (un)equal access, this has made the paper/digital consideration an increasingly arbitrary one. 3 The Hague is the governing capital of the Netherlands and the city's name is therefore often used as shorthand for 'politics' or 'the political system'.
limits the possibility that letters within a sample are biased towards certain salient events within a period or on particular days of the week. This method yielded a total sample of 1186 letters.
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The state under siege: an interpretative content analysis of letters to the editor
We performed an interpretative content analysis, a method that strives for developing theory through the categorisation of content (Hijmans, 1996; cf. Glaser and Strauss, 1967) . The first stage in the analysis consisted of identifying and selecting the letters that express political discontents in the broadest sense of the word, i.e. to make sure that no political discontents were excluded from the analysis. The bulk of the letters in our samples consisted of additions, appraisals, corrections and opinions in reaction to published articles or news-items, addressing rising prices, the quality of wines, rescue workers, child care, and many, many more issues not relevant here. A substantial number of letters that expressed political discontents in all its variety remained: these were letters expressing concerns, frustrations or dissatisfactions about the government, its agencies and officials, politicians and political parties (shorthand: the state).
5
The interpretative content analysis that yielded the insights outlined below is based on this selection, which includes a total number of 120 letters to the editor of De The analysis of these letters to the editor was based on the procedure of 'grounded theory' (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser and Strauss, 1967) : it consisted of an inductive process of coding and recoding, which resulted in a typology of three discourses of political discontents. These three discourses are conceptualised as 'the incompetent state', 'the alienated state' and 'the corrupted state', and represent the types of allegations found in the empirical analysis of the letters. In presenting the analysis these types are subdivided by the level of aggregation of the addressee under siege. This sub-typology distinguishes between 'people' (when a single official is scrutinised); 'groups or organisations' (when groups of officials or specific state agencies are under fire); and 'system' when the charges are aimed at the government, political-or other institutions that fall within the wide definition of the state (cf. Norris, 2011) .
The incompetent state
This first discourse revealed by our analysis mostly consists of expressions of discontents about specific incidents or events with regard to the functioning of the state. The basic argument here is that the state has allegedly failed the tasks it is supposed to fulfil. Typical for this particular discourse is the aim to correct the state: authors that utilised it point out a particular problem allegedly caused by a politician or (political) organisation and often propose solutions or alternatives in calling for a change of policy or for replacing a particular official.
Starting with the lowest level of aggregation, one rather innocent example of citizens correcting an official comprises of someone asking for subtitles whenever (then) prime minister Traffic announces an experiment to reward law abiding drivers, one letter writer concludes that 'this proves that the regulators have totally lost control', while another hypothesises 'I think the plan (..) has been devised by officials who have been struck by the heat' (both 13-08-04).
The highest level of aggregation -the whole system (and the rules and regulations it produces) -is also qualified as out of touch with reality. This impersonal and reified sense of 'system' is aptly expressed in a letter stating that '[w]hat Pim Fortuyn has prioritised is a growing sense of discontent among a large part of the population about what I would like to typify as "collective irresponsibility". After all, no one is responsible anymore for decisions that are made "in the general interest"' (10-05-02). Several letters addressing the alienation of the state focus on legislation that is not effective, or even represents an obstacle to life in general and business life in particular. In 2006 a reader points out that an entrepreneur 'has to slash himself through an impermeable plethora of rules even before starting a business, let alone to keep it running' (20-09-06). Furthermore, when 'given the economic situation' curved cucumbers are re-allowed by the EU, a reader cynically comments: 'fortunately, when the economy recovers the cucumbers will again be supplied (...) in their "correct" shape, [after which] the praiseworthy bureaucracy can also be re-established' (15-11-08) . Arguing that 'businesses are bullied away with an overabundance of bureaucratic regulations, overcrowded roads, exorbitant taxes and high wages' (19-04-03), one reader demonstrates that in De Telegraaf small business owners often comprise the main reference category of plain common sense, and that frustration of this category is therefore considered especially blameworthy. In sum, the system's rules and regulations, it is maintained in this discourse, lack any sense and, consequently, merely serve to keep a system running that is out of touch with reality.
The procedural formalism that is frequently being mocked in the letters to the editor of De Telegraaf, is furthermore experienced as dehumanising for individuals. This can be illustrated by a reader who expressed frustration over the case of Theo van Gogh's son, who was charged after skipping school on the day his father was murdered. The reader states this 'is yet another bureaucratic mistake of the ever expanding incompetent officialdom' (28-03-08). The proliferation of 'meaningless' or 'senseless' rules makes one reader even wonder whether 'that superior common sense that made us great has collapsed under suffocating regulations and alarming incompetence? ' (02-08-2000) .
Summarising, the basic argument of the second discourse found in our data -the alienated state -thus holds that the bureaucratic system of governance and its officials are out of touch with reality, their policies and rules are 'inhuman' and their actions consequently devoid of meaning. This is in line with Max Weber's suggestion that the formal rationalism, so prominent in modern bureaucratic institutions, collides with the substantive rationalism of individuals'
beliefs and values (cf. Brubaker, 1982) . Rationalisation in (state) bureaucracies -created as instruments of the collective will -may (or may not) be effective, but simultaneously motivates feelings of meaninglessness and alienation (Berger et al., 1974 (Berger et al., [1973 ). This is reflected in the discourse of the alienated state that was found in the letters to the editor of De Telegraaf.
The corrupted state
Whereas the previous section distinguished a discourse that fleshes out the state as a-moral -as a political system that has replaced moral meaning with formal rules and procedures -we now turn to discourse that portrays the state as immoral. We dubbed this category 'the corrupted state'. The general claim here is that political actors and institutions do not serve the general interest, as they should, but instead manipulate and abuse their power for personal, collective or ideological interests. In other words: whereas the previous discourse attributed the state's malfunctioning to its alienation from everyday reality, the discourse discerned here ascribes it to the ill will of politicians, officials, agencies or even the entire system. Besides the ill will ascribed to individual officials, the letters that demonstrate the discourse of the corrupted state also frequently attribute bad intentions to groups of officials -for instance by referring to the salaries of parliamentary representatives. In particular, the 'waiting fees' received by former representatives are frequently contrasted with the liberalisation of the labour legislation relating to the dismissal of employees: 10 'How does our government intend to diminish the rights upon discharge while it is receiving waiting fees itself for another eight years?' asks one letter writer. Another one stresses that since more than half of the former members of parliament receives these waiting fees, 'this means that former representatives are either incompetent or scroungers (..) '(29-08-07) . But the allegations directed at state officials pertain to more than their financial rewards. One reader, for example, questions the function of city districts in Amsterdam, by qualifying these as superfluous administrative layers that merely serve the interests of those employed there: 'a job circuit for politicians who don't feel like actually working. Now they're sitting there making up rules 32 hours a week (...). Get rid of those districts' (02-01-08). Such group interests are also considered to underlie culpable passivity. For instance, when banks announce to apply stricter rules for their debtors after the 2008 banking crisis, a reader comments that 'an actually dedicated Secretary would prevent this, but of course this doesn't apply to the current group of Secretaries (..) they wouldn't want to jeopardise their next job as a manager at a bank.' (20-04-09).
Finally, corruption is also believed to have penetrated the highest levels: 'the establishment', this argument goes, maintains its position by influencing court decisions, allocating powerful positions among friends, and abusing its power in other ways. For instance, by smothering innovative ideas that might threaten the status quo. Such an allegation is, for instance, expressed by a reader who argues that established political parties have co-opted Pim Fortuyn's ideas: 'With popular (..) talk the people are distracted from our country's real issues.
Meanwhile, the power is allocated in a way that suits these [established] parties best. In the end, nothing will have changed. After a change of seats among the elite, purple has merely changed colour' (16-01-03). 11 Another reader makes comparable allegations right after the murder of Fortuyn, explicitly capitalising 'they' and 'us', making it less specific than the one of the previous example, but more explicit in constructing an image of society consisting of two antagonistic groups: 'They have silenced him. They, who could not reply to his sharp rhetoric, his analyses and his interpretation of the voice of the people. Us, who should be able to express our wishes in a constitutional democracy. Us, who have been held aloof for too long (...). But Us know who is to blame…' (10-05-02). 12 In a similar vein, the advancement of the European Union is seen as undemocratic project of a self-serving elite: 'Turkey will probably also be shoved down our throats, just like the euro and open borders' (14-10-04) and that '[w]e, the Dutch, have never been asked [about the euro] (..). We are being told to respect others for their culture, but we have to abandon our own ' (04-07-2000) .
Summarising, whereas the second discourse we distinguished took the state's alleged dysfunctioning as a sign of its alienation from everyday reality, the discourse analysed in this category attributes it to the serving of vested interests. Instead of taking care of the general interest and performing public services for the people, the state, its agencies and officials are considered to be totally corrupt and accused of abusing their power. Such allegations show a striking resemblance with those expressed by contemporary populist parties with regard to the 'established, corrupt elite' (cf. Taggart, 2000; Canovan, 2005; Mudde, 2004; .
Conclusion
Even though the political discontents of citizens in western societies have been widely studied and acknowledged, it has thus far remained unclear what these are exactly about. Studies based on surveys measure the level or degree of those discontents in abstract and general terms, such as the 'level of trust in government'. And studies that did analyse the content of political discontents have typically focused on institutionalised populist discourses. Consequently, hardly any insights on the nature and content of political discontents as these are voiced by citizens themselves exist, while these can be of great value for scholarly endeavours aimed at understanding why the state did fall from grace in western countries in recent decades (cf. Hay and Stoker, 2009; Kaina, 2008; Van Wessel 2010) . That is why we set out to study what these The analysis of the letters that expressed discontents about the government, its agencies, officials, politicians and parties -shorthand: 'the state' -demonstrates that popular political discontents do not entail one unambiguous type of allegations. Instead, we inductively arrived at three discourses of political discontent: the incompetent state, the alienated state and the corrupted state. The first discourse has similarities with Norris' notion of the 'critical citizens', whose high aspirations and critical assertiveness are reflected in their attempts to correct the state at particular points cf. Tarrow, 2000) . As such, the discourse of the incompetent state represents a form of critical citizenship that points out what is in need of improvement, often accompanied with suggestions on how to do so. The discourse on the alienated state, on the other hand, reveals a less constructive stance vis-à-vis the state, as it accuses it of being completely detached from the reality and everyday lives of ordinary citizens. Whereas the first discourse is still concerned with the improvement of the functioning of the state, the second merely observes the state as an incomprehensible bureaucratic system lost in its own rules and procedures. The latter discourse therefore reflects the Weberian notions that feelings of meaninglessness, alienation and dehumanisation occur when processes of rationalisation progress to a point where formal rationalism reigns over human values (cf. Berger et al., 1974 Berger et al., [1973 ; Brubaker, 1982) . The third discourse -the corrupted state -is a more cynical one, as it interprets the dysfunctioning of the state as purposeful action of those who use their position for their own and group interests, both materially and ideologically. In this type the state is not so much a-moral (as in the second) but primarily immoral. The identification of these three discourses of political discontents has relevance for at least two academic debates.
First of all, our findings have implications for the work of scholars who discuss the decline of political trust and its consequences. The three discourses that we discerned on the basis of our analysis particularly have implications for the question whether or not public trust in political institutions can be restored with policy interventions. This is a core issue in the academic debate. Halman (2006: 97) , for instance, argues that declining levels of trust can be 'repaired' since trust in the government is largely dependent on policy evaluations and people's image of politics (cf. Akkerman, 2006 (Lipset and Schneider, 1983: 9) . This study provided a first step herein and demonstrated that at least three politicaldiscontent discourses exist, which require, if considered necessary, differentiated approaches.
Whereas the first of the discourses we discerned might be successfully repaired by means of policy initiatives, the others might not be, or even be aggravated. In addition, in this study we have grouped a relatively wide range of public actors under the label of 'the state'. Although this has served the explorative purpose of our research question, future research may specify whether the same critical discourses are levelled at all of those actors or whether particular actors are more vulnerable to specific discourses. The former case would imply a more generalized culture of discontent and the latter case might provide a basis for policy interventions. Such interventions, hence, would need to be customised and adapted to the specific types of discontents people have about the state. The formulation of such policies, we agree with Lipset and Schneider (idem), is however not the responsibility of scientists, but of politicians.
In addition, parts of the discontents described in this study resonate with what is commonly understood as (right-wing) populism (Mudde, 2004) , and our findings therefore also have relevance for the debate on that matter. Although the first discourse discerned tends to 'correct' the state and can hardly be considered populism as defined by Mudde and outlined in the introduction, the other two types can. Whereas the second discourse of the alienated state discredits established parties and politicians for being out of touch with everyday reality, the third one accuses those parties and politicians of being corrupted. These two discourses represent two features of the populist ideology, which typically 'excludes elements it sees as alien, corrupt or debased' (Taggart, 2000: 3) . Our study, therefore, indicates that these populist discourses can also be studied outside the political-institutional sphere (cf. Rooduijn, 2013) . All in all, the relevance of our findings for the debates on trust in politics and contemporary populism demonstrates that the study of political discontents can greatly benefit from a focus beyond the clearly demarcated political-institutional realm as well as on those formulated by citizens themselves. Such a focus can lead to a better understanding of those discontents amongst ordinary citizens, particularly in times when there are no populist parties to express them.
Some limitations of the present study may, nonetheless, inform future research on contemporary political discontents. First of all, as we have argued in the former paragraph, the discontents our analysis has identified are predominantly right-leaning. While this is in line with the analysis of a 'silent counter-revolution' (Ignazi, 1992) , recent developments in the Dutch political landscape, in which new-rightist parties have taken up government responsibilities, make the emergence of other (e.g., leftist) discontents plausible (Dekker et al., 2013: 95-102) . To inform theoretical advancement pertaining to popular political discontents in general, new research questions may thus inquire whether the classification proposed here is exhaustive or perhaps in need of supplements or alterations when studying other groups. Likewise, the Dutch context, with its particular 'consensus democratic' tradition (Hendriks, 2009; cf. Lijphart, 1968) may limit the generalizability of our typology. Finally, it remains to be seen to what degree our results rely on the decision to study letters to the editor. These are, after all, subject to selection and editing by the newspaper (Wahl-Jorgenson, 2004) , while online content is less heavily moderated and may thus offer more variation.
A more general question that comes to mind concerns the study's political relevance, or the consequences these different political discontents may have with respect to people's political behaviour. Do specific critical discourses spark specific political behaviour? People may, for example, motivate changes in their voting behaviour by arguing in one of these three ways.
